THE AESTHETIC SPHERE OF THE JEWISH SPECTATOR AND THE GUILT`S NEGATIVE DIALECTICS: FROM ADORNO`S IMPOSSIBILITY TO WRITE AFTER AUSCHWITZ TO CHAGALL`S EUROPEAN “DEGENERATED ART”

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Impossibility vs. Unauthenticity: The Abdicated Subject

In the first case, the experience of Auschwitz is devoted to a dialectic discourse that confirms the philosopheme of pure identity as death, in Adorno`s hermeneutical key, opening the dimension of a moral normative mechanism of “looking back” at its cultural heritage:

“What is not wrong however is the less cultural question of whether it is even permissible for someone who accidentally escaped and by all right ought to have been murdered, to go on living after Auschwitz. Their continued existence already necessitates the coldness, of the basic principle of the capitalist subjectivity, without which Auschwitz would not have been possible: the drastic guilt of the spared” (Adorno 2001:213, transl. D.R).

I shall argue that this is the principle source of “the aesthetic sphere of the Jewish spectator”, agreed by Kierkegaard`s philosophy and introduced by Adorno in the Negative Dialectic scheme, that derives a different accent of this new paradigm: the aesthetic of weakness and the “animality” of desilusion. According to Adorno, “that which is inhuman in this, the capacity to distance oneself and rise above things by being a spectator, is in the end precisely what is human, whose ideologues react so vehemently against” (Adorno 2001:213, transl. D.R.), human and inhuman, being, in my opinion, under his discourse, the two faces for the Subject regarded as Self and as Otherness, as principal actor and as a survivor, as story-teller and as spectator.
The examination of Adorno`s *Negative Dialect* will end, at this level, by shifting cultural, aesthetical and political perspectives in order to explain why, inspired by this philosophical trend, the literature begin to be tolerant to the hermetical discourse, as Paul Celan`s one, agreed by Adorno and defined as a typical and ideal manner to express the absolute horror through silence¹, arguing that by this model, the literature post-Auschwitz succeeded in procure negative roles to the veridical content, promoting the art as an antithesis to the given reality, the European culture as a sensitive reflex to any resistance in front of Bad, as Beckett`s drama`s pages pretend, and the “aesthetisation of the praxis”, as method to model the social myths about culpability and genocide lines.

The main problem is represented by the contradictions that may occur by subjecting Adorno`s different perspectives about the possibility to give Auschwitz a proper narrative context, to a hermeneutical approach. Three are his main tensioned statements:

1. “To write poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric” (Adorno 2003:34), the theses being exposed in a developed formula later, by claiming the fact that “It has become impossible to write poetry today” (Adorno 2003:34);
2. “Art may be the only remaining medium of truth in an age of incomprehensible terror and suffering” (Adorno 1984:27)
3. “Perennial suffering has as much right to expression as a tortured man has to scream; hence it may have been wrong to say after Auschwitz you could no longer write poems” (Adorno 2001:213)

¹ The fundamental criticism that Adorno addresses to any form of literary creation inserted in the post-Auschwitz era is based on a defence movement against the barbaric written historical testimonies, no matter the fictional degree it may adopt. Nevertheless, even if Adorno submitted the idea that any written creation conceived after Auschwitz is barbaric, he never directed his sentence to the philosophical condition of any knowledge that might take a similar form. The philosophical discourse was never mentioned, even if it represented the singular instrument for a critical treatment that he ever applied in such an analysis.
In my opinion, each of Adorno’s three thesis contributes to the formulation of a critique of violence\(^1\), abusing, in this context, the traditional form of Benjamin. In the first instance, we can easily observe the manner in which the history of post-Auschwitz, that is postulated using the practices of subjectivation, is described in terms of authenticity through the conceptual couple: possible-impossible. A certain approach developed in the mentioned direction is not a complete one: nevertheless, it was the common manner used to describe Adorno’s theoretical intentions. What we observe here, from my point of view, is the archaeology of a construction that claims the fact that the main postmodern narrative construction of the Subject is an illusion, at least because of the suffering experience that each person had to endure once that the autonomy value was suspended. And this is the key-concept.

I shall argue, starting from this point, that regarding the principal sense Adorno gave to the terms of Auschwitz and Holocaust, we shall see how each thesis described above gains coherence not only in placing the relation between art and society into an equation having its final result a production of narrative contents, but also in understanding why art, philosophy, literature and history are equal, once that they are all procuring, through the critique of violence that might be expressed using their instruments, an internal tension disputed by ethical and aesthetical perspectives, transforming the matter of the Subject into a problem of representation. We shall see that once the Subject is reduced at a representation-as problem content, than the fundamental relation between autonomy and authenticity will allow us to understand all the ethical and aesthetical implications for a potential answer given to Karl Richter question about why and how it is possible to silence Auschwitz? (Richter 1972:10).

First of all, let`s proceed a deconstruction scheme. Adorno uses the Auschwitz term only as a general context to invoke the

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\(^1\) Somehow, Adorno seems to situate his critique in the proximity of Benjamin’s one, considering the entire Holocaust an administrated crime. According to Benjamin, “All mythic, law-making violence, which may call ‘executive’ is pernicious. Pernicious, too, is the law-preserving, “administrative” violence that serves it”. (Benjamin 1978: 252)
moral context of atrocities and the tragedy of a humanity based on inexplicable terror. The concept becomes a symbol for the concentrated death, but for many contemporary interprets, it became just a general term used to inaugurate ‘the commodification of the Holocaust’¹. But Holocaust involves, in an etymological line, the sense of ‘total destruction’. David Huebert, later, in order to postulate a difference, will state the fact that

‘I use the phrase —the Holocaust only because, in contemporary culture, it carries the connotations of the concept I mean to evoke with it. I use it not in the older sacrificial sense, but in the modern, secular, and historically specific sense’. (Huebert 2008: 2).

I consider that the distance between moral and aesthetical contrasts proposed by the main historical actors participating to the alternative Auschwitz-Holocaust is based on something more sensitive: when Adorno refers to the barbarism of *post-Auschwitz art*- that I shall understand as a main context for any kind of representation- graphical, pictorial, discursive one-, he is looking to express the failure of a remaining medium of truth in an age of incomprehensible terror and suffering, and by suffering we shall understand a historical consequence derived from all the conditions that cause unnecessary human pain.

The ‘pre’ and ‘post’ Auschwitz consciousness is the conflict between ethical and aesthetical representations for typical discourses- philosophical, artistic, poetical or dramaturgical ones- that might validate, only through a simple representation, the Holocaust’s culture, and not its system of values, narrations and expressions for authenticity that survivors may give to humanity in order to understand how far may go the *subjectivation* practices, but

¹ This kind of process is determined by moral frames inspired from the collective memory, generated to discuss social implications of the Holocaust in terms of violence’s public recognition, victims, abuse of memories or, much more delicate, in terms of ‘therapeutic culture for a nation of victims’. But in this discourse, the commodification is regarded as a process which defines popular representations of the Holocaust, involving all its ideological contents.
the ideology of the society that give a cause, a reason and a Final Solution for the Holocaust. This is why, I pretend that Richardson was right understanding that

‘Clearly Adorno is not merely speaking about the act of writing poetry, but rather the tension between ethics and aesthetics inherent in an act of artistic production that reproduces the cultural values of the society that generated the Holocaust’. It is the singular path, at least at a first glimpse, to explain why Adorno rectified its thesis and, more than that, why he qualified the assessment that ‘suffering [...] also demand she continued existence of the very art it forbids’. (Richardson 2005:2)

Taking into account the next statement- ‘When even genocide becomes cultural property in committed literature, it becomes easier to continue complying with the culture that gave rise to the murder’ (Adorno 1997: 252-253)- the representation of the Holocaust will be exposed not in terms of possible-impossible, but in terms of speakable-unspeakable\(^1\). Nevertheless, the authenticity problem remains: representation, contextualized in literature, art or

\(^1\) The speakable-unspeakable report might be concentrated by the Foucauldian perspective understood by Hirsch as a `screaming silence` about Nazism (to be consulted Hirsch 1991:121). Conceived as an objectification of humans, the Holocaust might be a form of constructing the genealogy of the modern subject applying a bio-power in order to define a disciplinary world habited by docile bodies. The thanatopolitics (Foucault 1988: 160) of the Holocaust is precisely the result of an exercised regimes of practices crated to dissolve individual differentiations and ‘impure communities’ in a huge dispositive of power. In fact, this is what the Nazi’s projects involves, in Foucauldian terms, because ‘... it is not just the destruction of other races which is the objective of the Nazi regime. The destruction of other races is one side of the Nazi projects. The other side is to expose one’s own race to the absolute and the universal danger of death. The risk of death... is one of the principles inscribed among the fundamental obligations to which a Nazi is subject, and one of the essential objectives of Nazi policy’ (Foucault 1991:535). Speakable and unspeakable are products of a dispositif, a sum of institutional and discursive practices that can create a socio-political reality, in this case, the Auschwitz’s one.
philosophy, cannot pass an adequacy impasse to convey the reality of a lived experience, one that performs a different ethical and aesthetic subjectivation, from one Person to another. Just in order to take an example, look at Richardson example, constructed by using Lang’s theory about the moral implications of the representation-as technique.

Lang goes on to qualify any form of representation as essentially a ‘representation-as’ (Lang 2000: 51), in which case we can see that any representation is entirely subjective: ‘whereas a survivor of Auschwitz might represent the Holocaust as a living hell, a surviving SS officer might represent the same experience as an excellent career opportunity. All representations-as, for Lang, imply the possibility of other representations-as. The question thus arises: if no form of representation is adequate to convey the extreme pain and suffering experienced by the Holocaust survivor, ‘that experience itself being a mediation of the original object’ (van Alphen 1999:27), is it morally and/or ethically correct to attempt representation at all?’ (Richardson 2005:2).

Apparently, the collective memory needs the narrative representation of that kind of human atrocity at least to constitute an educational framework created to accomplish Adorno’s advice:

The premier demand upon all education is that Auschwitz not happens again. (Adorno 2003: 19)

But I will come back to this kind of statement during the second part of my analysis, I only use it here to indulge a specific context regarding the necessity character of the representation. Many critiques have argued that a survivor’s discourse might denaturate and depersonalize tactics used in the Nazi concentration camps, the simple reproduction, through discourse, even if it is a memorial one, creating what Peter Haidu called ‘narrative of desubjectification’ (Haidu 1992). Of course, to any representation

\[1\] I shall argue in a different section of this paper the fact that desubjectification might be a therapeutic form of culture, serving the representation’s nature to be a voice for the unspeakable’s memory. Analysing Boltanski’s works, Pedersen states that ‘I will not read them as an all-embracing testimony to the traumatic and to most commentators unrepresentable historical event to which we refer by
we should be able to create an alternative or a totally different discourse, but the simple fact that we are discussing such a point of view gives us the proof that there is still a general concern for using appropriate methods of commemoration. At this level of my own research, I was surprised to observe the fact that partisans of both sides, those who admit the necessity of any testimony evidence for coherent, collective and individual memory representations, as well as those that attached the Holocaust discourse to an impossible and an immoral or inauthentic representation, lose from their sight that once a representation is experienced and recreated by his Author, than it is the representation of a Subject assumed as a Person. Or, the Representation must be the Person`s main possession.

In these circumstances it becomes apparent that the representation of the Holocaust is not only morally acceptable, it is also a matter of necessity: as Lang remarks, ‘the question confronting us is not whether the Holocaust is speakable but how to justify what is spoken’ (Lang 2000:19), or in the words of Thomas Trezise, ‘not whether but how it should be represented’ (Trezise 2001:43).

**Stylisation of the Holocaust or Adorno`s Unspeakable Representation**

It has been claimed that `the word Holocaust is already a stylisation`, but it seems that we have just been convinced of this perspective by trying to donate a proper sense to Adorno`s use of terms, starting with the three thesis mentioned above. Any representation is speculated as a discourse that reveals the inhuman conditions attached to the Auschwitz`s world. Moreover, moral judgments depend on the stylisation technique applied to a simple confession or to a reconstruction paradigm. Subjectivation means

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the name of the Holocaust, but on the contrary focus on a certain aspect of the Holocaust: namely desubjectification – that is, the reduction of the human being to naked life, to wordless, almost inhuman Muselmann – and show how this desubjectification is transformed into a more general human experience in Boltanski (controversially Boltanski, who is half Jewish, has said: “The Holocaust is only an example of dying. Of common and impersonal dying.”). (Pedersen 2005:77)
creation of a fictional narrative foundation developed to recover an experience formulated from the point of view of the survivor, as a Jewish spectator, or from the point of view of the neutral part, from those who get to know the Holocaust only by books, revealing empathy and, in consequence, being at least because of a possible logic, put in front of the Jewish’s Spectator’s eyes. There is also the other part our story- ironically, it will matter not who is the story-teller, but how is represented its narration: the fictional literature attached to the Holocaust inheritance additionally reacts as a speculation, creating a specific experience, a consumable one, in terms of postmodernism, very similar with the authentic ones.

Richardson argues:

*For one thing, a work of fiction is in many ways more accessible than a survivor memoir, and as such can be seen to have a certain pedagogical value. In this way, Holocaust fiction may provoke an interest in the wider genre that might otherwise have remained unrealised.* (Richardson 2005:7)

*Furthermore, a work of fiction has the power to take the narrative to places that survivor testimony cannot* (Richardson 2005:7)

*The representation matter becomes plausible in defining moral limits through aesthetical transgressions. Lang remarks the transgressions qualities distinguishing1:*

1. Unimaginable and impossible transgressions
2. Imaginable but impossible transgressions
3. Unimaginable yet possible transgressions
4. Imaginable and possible transgressions

*Now, Richardson claims that in Spielberg’s movie, for example, To show prisoners being gassed would be both imaginable and possible, yet he appears to set a moral representational limit for his film, in that it never moves beyond what can be shown or described in survivor testimony.* (Richardson 2005:7)

1 According to Richardson, this is the correct taxonomy of representation’s aesthetical transgression as Lang proposes.
Holocaust’s legacy, in canons of representation, is a narration about what happened, not primarily why and how. It is a helpful perspective to give a reason to Adorno’s retraction of the impossibility of post-Auschwitz writing, or, generally speaking, art; creating from Samuel Beckett an exemplary artist that succeeded in creating an aesthetic remembrance, quite appropriate, to the Holocaust, in an indirect manner, Adorno offers the ideal context to examine the possibility of veridical and authentic representations of the Holocaust, determining that ‘the need for aestheticizations of the Shoah is less vital than the need for radical societal reconfiguration-the cultivation of conditions which would prevent the emergence of new Holocaust’ (Huebert 2008:3).


Beckett is authentic for Adorno because of his refusal to name the catastrophe as such- obviously, his appetite for aesthetical occurrences is not an obstacle to claim us all as survivors, in Wiesel’s style. It is a universal responsibility trial that art might solve by emerging instruments to prevent the recurrence of Auschwitz in augmented or restrained forms. Beckett is a resistance promoter and this is why, authentic post-Auschwitz art might be possible. Memories and dramatized confessions are pastoral worlds for Subjects that regard to post-Auschwitz art, looking for the deconstruction of the autonomous subject and for a critique of arbitrary power hierarchies, with ethical implications that cultivate lessons of decisions, like Beckett’s *Endgame*.

Nevertheless, it is a step forward to demonstrate both the necessity and the possibility of post-Auschwitz art and representation. What could we have instead of it? Agamben has an answer, and I tend to find it appropriate:

*To transform Auschwitz into a reality absolutely separated from language is to —unconsciously repeat the Nazis‘ gesture* (Agamben 1999:157).

*The unspeakable* is capitalizing a moral prohibition depending by the risk to manipulate or dominate a certain production of
truth. It is not only educative, but also emancipatory to give to a representation the potential of the source of a genealogy of truth, one that is mediated by art in order to explain suffering and terror as forms of appearance. Even if Adorno thinks that art must be excused by any political utility, concentrating its materiality, avoiding ideology, taking into account the present, the aesthetical contents seem to create dialectic imagery for a humanity that needs to be normalized through and by art. Jay remarked, in the continuity of Adorno’s project, that

*The Frankfurt School always insisted, it was only by the refusal to celebrate the present that the possibility might be preserved of a future in which writing poet would no longer be an act of barbarism* (Jay 1985:37)

The salvation through art is still pertinent, at least in my opinion. Beckett is a typical example for the manner in which a representation speaks out of the artefact rather than out of the subject. The critique of violence through art is a genealogy of truth, but it still remains the horizon of questioning whether or not, art may interfere and claim a reconciliation form. In light of this content, Adorno seemed to admit the necessity to review his three main theses, considering that

*The statement that it is not possible to write poetry after Auschwitz does not hold absolutely, but it is certain that after Auschwitz, because Auschwitz was possible and remains possible for the foreseeable future, lighthearted art is no longer conceivable. Objectively, it degenerates into – cynicism, no rather how much it relies on kindness and understanding. (Adorno 1992:251)*

Absorbing empirical realities to autonomous dimensions of form, art could be the voice of the main failure of specific utopias and socio-historical tensions, not being propagandistic, as Adorno himself tended to believe in the first age of his these. For sure, art procures to the Jewish Spectator a negative dialectics, not only a negative critique: as in Beckett’s *Endgame*, once that Auschwitz confirms the philosopheme of pure identity as death, the most
provocative indulgence of art is to procure to the Subject the ethical maximalism through a minimal ontology: there would no longer be anything to really be afraid of, the superlative of suffering was expressed in the annihilation program of the non-identical. Art remains problematic after Adorno’s retraction only when it represents a domestic approach for those who apply for the Jewish Spectator’s function.

In his *Negative Dialectics*, Adorno remarks:

*What is not wrong however is the less cultural question of whether it is even permissible for someone who accidentally escaped and by all rights ought to have been murdered, to go on living after Auschwitz.* (Adorno 2001:231).

The drastic guilt of the spared, as he understands what I have called the Spectator’s condition, is based on a principle of capitalist subjectivity. The aesthetic sphere involved in here is developed through a critique of philosophical personalism, taking into account all the existential attitudes and builds, in the same time, the nullity of existence. Art’s possibilities are related to the force of the cultural inheritance of Auschwitz to designate the philosopheme of pure identity as death, to create from the Self-Identity an artefact for disappearance. This is how self-preservation fight against the Subject’s abolition – history is moving towards and art seems to be concerned of the guilty of the spared, regarded as a form of reflection.

Reflective people, and artists, not seldom have the feeling of not quite being there, of not playing along; as if they were not at all themselves, but a sort of spectator:

*But the attitude of being a spectator expresses at the same time the doubt as to whether this could be all there is, while nonetheless the subject, so relevant in its delusion, has nothing other than that poverty and ephemerality, which is animalistic in its impulses. Under the bane living beings have the alternative between involuntary ataraxy – an aesthetic of weakness – and the animality of the involved. Both are false life. Something of each however belongs to a right désinvolture and sympathy. That guilt reproduces itself unceasingly, because it cannot be completely present to the
consciousness at any moment. This, nothing else, compels one to philosophy. (Adorno 2001: 213).

In consequence, I suspect that art can afford a negative dialectics for a cultural heritage that the Auschwitz moment let behind as a process\(^1\). As speculation, it might give a common sense to any representation of that inhuman global treatment, the main task being to procure educational practices for civic policies in order to avoid the similarity and the reproduction of events dedicated to totally destruction. And yet, even after retracting the impossibility character of the authentic art in a post-Auschwitz era, Adorno claims that

All culture after Auschwitz, including its urgent critique, is garbage. (Adorno 2001: 215).

The problem is still the reconstruction`s circumstances: how would Beckett`s *Endgame* look like if he had been in Auschwitz, recreating his Spectator status through the Subject`s experience avatar? In consequence, I shall clear up a few thing and discourse strategies about the quality of representation and the opportunities of art, before proceeding to the next level. It is sure that cultural critique and barbarism share common senses for Adorno, and that they often seem to develop a mediated practice through art\(^2\). Therefore, the final tension is not the impossibility- nevertheless, retracted, of an authentic post-Auschwitz art or representation, but

\(^1\) This sort of critical treatment is inspired by Adorno`s tendency to discuss any dialectical approach to aesthetics as a dependent construct of art regarded as a socially, historically and politically consequential source of truth. But even when he admits civilisation as a result of barbarity and as a condition of force, we might treat Adorno`s theory from a Foucauldian perspective, art being a pure note in a full era of Death`s technologies.

\(^2\) It must be highly appreciated the coexistence of Adorno`s theory, as a fundment for any critique of the capitalist culture, with theories of Benjamin and Beckett. In a full background of violence, the Author`s condition for authenticity in constructing any representation is a manner to discuss together the real past and the historical subject both in a social and imaginary context.
the synonymy, never recognised by Adorno, between *impossibility* and *unthinkable*. The resentful ethics that we take into account, in Nietzsche`s style, when we talk about the aesthetical representation of a crime against humanity is based on the difference`s importance between fact and fiction describing an experience that has to prevent the method of his exercise.

I recognise the fact that I voluntary missed a potential development of my research approaching the critique of violence through art in a hermeneutical key of the substitution of religious contents assumed in order to temper social crises with civic representative discourses. Although, I shall remind the fact that Adorno himself granted that

> *Art as critique may assume the prophetic task which religion has so often abandoned, like a prophet, art in its various forms articulates the suffering and struggles of its context.* (Nafziger-Leis 1997:9)

This is why I feel the necessity to analyse Adorno`s idea of degenerated art, as an inauthentic discourse about post-Auschwitz reconstructions and narrative interpretations, both in visual and literary dimensions, from another perspective, and, to be more precisely, from the original point of view created to depict the Jewish Subject as a Spectator. If Adorno understood Auschwitz as an anticivilisation production, than, in order to complete the dialectics, we will need a third period for rehabilitation. For him, this one was represented by the retraction movement- giving a new sense to any post-Auschwitz art and representation, included into a fresh theological scheme- the educational one, supposed to the natural imperative to avoid a duplicate, a second disaster. But, it might be not enough to negotiate the European Identity, at least not for our contemporary context.

In consequence, in the second case, I will discuss the artistic pathology of the aesthetic sphere of the Jewish spectator, by analysing Marc Chagall`s paintings, regarded in the European folklore as “the Jewish Picasso”. I will explain the potential of this etiquette to be both a clear symptom of creating from the Jewish status a European Identity and a declared process meant to Europeanize a
Jewish specific representation, integrated in a cultural heritage, conciliated with its past and universalized by the only type of discourse with unanimously significance- the artistic one. I shall argue that the pieces of Chagall confiscated by the Nazi`s resistance and qualified as “a Degenerated Art” were forms of individuation for a metaphysical way to interpret the Jewish Subject, and later became, under the oppression, blamed representations of those who used to be depicted as non-European “internal others”. In the end, I will propose an authentic manner to see Chagall`s post-Auschwitz creations as a responsible art for renegotiating the concepts of Europeanness, Self, Otherness and the pain`s aesthetics, from the position of the spectators who paints from himself, Chagall being one of the Jews who gave colour, speculation and principles to the anxiety of the Subject and to its solitude.

Devoid of the attraction of colour and governed by the aesthetic sphere of the Jewish spectator, the Guilt`s Negative Dialectics defines not only the roles of Jewish art after philosophy, but also its capacity to design a space of *rethinking the borders of Europe as a post-mortem representation*, discussed today in terms of events, from Walter Benjamin`s death to Christian Boltanski`s critical treatment applied to the Holocaust through mixed media/materials installations and photos. In the end, everything obliges us to be Subjects and Objects of the same question: *after Auschwitz, what?* In philosophy, inspired by literature and art, the question was restored nowadays: *after metaphysics, what?* We shall see if any equivalence is legitimate.

**The Jewish Picasso:**

**Chagall. Rethinking the Borders of Europe as a Post-Mortem Representation**

Very few know the fact that one of the main arguments developed in order to sustain the degenerated art quality was represented by the perfect synonymy between degenerated art and modern art, that the Nazi`s critique addressed to the Jewish representations. Declaring itself a partisan of idealistic and romantic form, the critique postulated the Jewish culture in degenerated terms of construction. Shocking, maybe for our actual
context, at a first glimpse, but not for the Spirit of the Nazi Society, the German perspective about art was directed to approve and promote traditional cultural representations, and not modern ones, specifically remarked as Expressionistic. Not restricted by forms, academic canons of representation or traditional structures of art, Expressionism militated for the authenticity of social exposure, and unfortunately, went to pay for its attitude during the Auschwitz’s drama.

It was the moment of 1927 when the National Socialist Society for German Culture claimed the corruption of art organised in degenerate contents, attached to a culture that could refer to visual art or literature or music made by a Jew or a black person. The astonishing part is that it could refer also to any art that was Avant-Garde or Modern.

Condemning modern art started as a serious movement in 1933 when the destruction of galleries, museums and colleges of modern art and artist started, more than 16000 works of art being described as degenerated. 5000 pieces were burned. We are not looking to express the implications of quantitative indicators, rather than that, we are trying to see the quality of Chagall’s art brought to profile the degenerated creation.

The romantic realism was loyal to idyllic landscapes featuring the common life of the Aryan Subjects. The exile begins with Max Beckmann, Paul Klee, Marcel Duchamp, Marc Chagall.

As a specific hint, I suggest to keep in mind the following contrast line that the Principal Catalogue of the Degenerated Art Exhibition include

As an act of confidence in their campaign to eradicate the art they described as Degenerate the Nazis organized a large exhibition of that work in 1937. They attempted to show the public that the art was corrupt and depraved. They gathered 650 paintings, sculptures, prints and books (...)

The Exhibition started in Munich, toured to ten other cities in Germany and Austria and was seen by over three million people. As the war began and the Nazi threats were turned into the reality of the Holocaust, many artists were sent to the ghettos, concentration camps and death camps. Some of
these artists used the meagre resources they had around to keep working. The work they made is described as the Art of the Holocaust. (Morley; Nunn 2005:73).

Before Chagall, there was Art in Auschwitz. This is why I have collected a few proofs:

I asked myself why I was drawing, when I was fighting day and night. This is something similar to biological continuation. Every man, every people, is interested in continuing his people, his family, in bringing children into the world of the future, in leaving this one thing. Another motivation was to get information to the so-called free world about the cruel, cruel actions- so that there would be some documentation. To tell this to a world that was completely ignorant. To be creative in this situation of the Holocaust, this is also a protest. Each man when he came face to face with real danger, with death, reacts in his own way. The artists react through his medium. This is his protest. This is my medium. He reacts artistically. This is his weapon. (Alexander Bogen, in The Living Witness: Art in Concentration Camps and Ghettos)

Advancing with my research, I got more and more convinced by the Spectator`s Paradigm. For example, the Czech Jewish artist Alfred Kantor wrote:

Sketching took a new urgency. Even though I knew there was no chance to take these sketches out of Auschwitz, I drew whenever possible.... My commitment to drawing came out of a deep instinct for self-preservation and undoubtedly helped me to deny the unimaginable horrors of life. At that time. By taking the role of observer, I could at least for a few moments detach myself from what was going on in Auschwitz and was therefore better able to hold together the threads of sanity”. (Alfred Kantor, The Book of Alfred Kantor, An Artist`s Journal of the Holocaust).

In time, the Jewish Picasso appeared: Chagall started to depict crucial moments of a human life with the categorical perspective of a Jew`s eye. From *the Birth*, painted in 1910, including naïve
Christian motives, to any other painting, Chagall insisted on the mixture of Christianity and Jewish Symbolism. The tendency remained, describing the anthropological Jew’s village perspective, under a Cubist impression, exploring the corporeality as an universal artefact. This is why, in his *Self-Portrait* from June 1914, Chagall surprised, at his return from Russia, the expression of concern: after *The Cemetery Gates*, Chagall started his own renewal, depicted for his people. When everybody died, the Spectator remained in Solitude: it is Chagall’s confession through the painting with the same name. Moreover, 

‘In 1931 Chagall visited Palestine, *The Promised Land* of the Jewish people, being aware of different events around him. The Nazis had do come to power in Germany and Chagall recorded this feeling of unease in his paintings. In 1933, Solitude symbolizes the concern he has for the Jewish People. The cloaked man is interpreted from Judaism as Ahasverus, the eternal Wandering Jew, roaming the world uncertain if his future. In comparison, during the same period Picasso also painted in response to acts of war and political climate’. It is about the Guernica issue, Picasso claiming that ‘painting was not invented to decorate houses. It is an instrument of war for attack and defence’ (Horton 2008:10).

*The White Crucifixion* was Chagall’s symbol given to the suffering expression: in the world of faith and uniforms, there is the Alterity, the Whole Spectator, watching the Final Solution. In consequence, there he need a Revolution, the 1937 painting’s promotion being attached to the next quotation of Chagall:

> Will God or someone give me the power to breathe my sight into my canvass, the sight of prayer of salvation, of rebirth? (Horton 2008:12).

I especially took Chagall’s case as an analysis pretext in order to provoke us all to regard the problem of representation in terms of creating an European Identity: the Spectator’s Paradigm is, because of nature’s progress, the only status that we might afford. It is an exercise to see in a particular death, the death of all of us, as
Boltanski\textsuperscript{1} provoked us many times through his work of art: Post-Holocaust Art is, from this point of view, the same interval with After-Auschwitz`s Culture.

As I already mentioned, the capacity to design a space of \textit{rethinking the borders of Europe as a post-mortem representation}, discussed today in terms of events, from Walter Benjamin`s death to Christian Boltanski`s critical treatment applied to the Holocaust through mixed media/materials installations and photos. It is easily to understand nowadays why through this kind of instrument we create discourses about the deprivation of individuality. He once answered that creating a project about the Holocaust is a utopia: we have all the means give a voice and to give a sense to the life of post-Auschwitz consciousness, and only as Spectators.

\textbf{Conclusions}

Thinking the individual in the post-mortem representations canons is not just a solidarity expression for a universal structure given to the European Identity: I strongly recommend, to the end of my arguments, to review certain context that, for our contemporary research fields might give a powerful support to rethink boundaries and practices of Education After Auschwitz, quoting Adorno`s main article, the Western legacy of positivity, the role of art and

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{1} Christian Boltanski`s installation Personnes for Monumenta 2010 at the Grand Palais, Paris is one of the most expressive works of art dedicated to the reconstruction of the collective representations of the Auschwitz phenomena. Even he created a enormous postmodern reification of the historical event, yet, Boltanski declared in Odessa, during one of his exhibitions organized at the Jewish Museum: "My work is about the fact of dying, but it's not about the Holocaust itself.". Manipulated photographs and reconstructions of different archetypes of the Auschwitz`s memory are generating a postmodern form of narration, one dedicated to the impersonal death. In main terms, his work serves to the current analysis as a discussion frame for the postmodern value of a Person as a human being and the value of an impersonal, but collective, death. This is why the artist admits that "All my work is more or less about the Holocaust; The Holocaust is only an example of dying. Of common and impersonal dying." (Interview with Steinar Gjessing, November 1993, in Terskel/Threshold nr. 11 Oslo, January 1994, p. 43).}
pure representations exercised in creating an authentic critique of violence or memory of suffering into an administrated world regarded in terms of finitude, the intimate differences between fact and fiction in developing normalization and subjective practices to normalize social conducts. Somehow, after all this investigation, more or less innovative, we know for sure that is part of our own Minima Moralia to be A Jewish Spectator, at least once, in our whole life.

**Bibliography**


